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The pollution haven hypothesis affirms that an open market regime will encourage the 
flow of low technology polluting industries toward developing countries, due to 
potential comparative advantages related to low environmental standards. In contrast, 
the hypothesis suggested by Porter and van der Linde claims for a competitive dynamic 
behaviour by innovating firms, allowing a global diffusion of environmental-friendly 
technologies. Environmental regulation may represent a relevant mechanism through 
which technological change is induced. In this way countries subject to more stringent 
environmental regulations may become net exporters of environmental technologies. 
This paper provides new evidence on the evolution of export flows of environmental 
technologies across different countries for the energy sector. Advanced economies, 
particularly the European Union, have given increasing attention to the role of energy 
policies as tools for sustaining the development path. The Kyoto Protocol commitments, 
together with growing import dependence of energy products, have stimulated the 
attention on the analysis of innovation processes in this specific sector. The analysis 
uses a gravity model in order to test the determinants and the transmission channels 
through which environmental technologies for renewable energies and energy efficiency 
are exported to advanced and developing countries. Our results are consistent with the 
existence of the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis, where environmental regulation 
represents a significant component of comparative advantages. What strongly emerges 
is that the stringency of environmental regulation supplemented by the strength of 
National Innovation System is a crucial driver of export performance in the field of 
energy technologies. 
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1.  INTROUCTION 
The  interaction  between  trade  flows  and  environmental  regulations  has  become  quite  a 
topical issue recently. There is a common belief that by applying more lenient environmental 
regulations, countries tend to reduce production costs of their manufactures and thus improve 
their ability to export, despite the possibility to become pollution havens. There have been 
many empirical studies performed in this field, trying to estimate this relationship. Empirical 
results  provide  non  univocal  results  supporting  this  relationship  (Antweiler  et  al.,  2001; 
Bommer, 1999; Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Grether and De Melo, 2003; Letchumanan and 
Kodama, 2000, Levinson and Taylor, 2004, among the others). On the contrary, the theory of 
dynamic  competitiveness  deriving  from  technological  innovation  linked  to  stringent 
environmental standards has been exposed fashionably by Porter and van der Linde (1995). 
Even in the case of this second hypothesis results are not univocal, and many additional 
conditions, rather than only stringency of environmental regulations, provide comparative 
advantages obtained through technological leadership. These additional conditions include a 
number  of  factors,  such  as  the  existence  of  an  international  framework  in  which 
environmental standards are homogeneous, the existence of a long-term perspective, thus 
reducing investment risks, but above all the possibility to obtain high profit margins from 
being first comers. 
Looking  at  recent  documents  published  by  the  European  Commission,  it  seems  that  the 
Kyoto  Protocol  could  be  an  efficient  framework  of  environmental  regulation,  with  an 
international  institutional  framework  which  could  reduce  uncertainty,  increase  market 
demand for environmental-friendly products and technologies, and increase profit incentives 
for first comers. The existence of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol provides the 
institutional framework for the functioning of a regulated market where virtuous firms can 
sell their clean products. At the same time, the necessity to substantially reduce Greenhouse 
gases (GHG) emissions with domestic measures seems to push towards increasing technical 
progress within the Annex I countries. In this specific case, there is no complete agreement at 
international levels about the real costs for industrialized countries related to climate change 
control  policies.  Following  the  position  of  the  United  States,  the  economic  impact  for 
domestic firms could be negative, with increasing production costs and loosing international 
competitive advantages. 
On the contrary, the European Union has fully embraced climate change as a global problem 
where  industrialized  countries  could  be  the  first  engine  for  the  development  of  clean 
technologies. Considering the EU long-term development strategies, i.e. the Lisbon strategy  
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and the Goteborg Declaration, the EU considers technical progress as a major source of 
dynamic growth, and environmental regulations can be interpreted as a positive impulse to 
economic development. Rather than continuing with carbon intensive production processes 
and  products,  the  European  firms  should  adopt  an  innovation  path  oriented  towards 
renewable energies and energy efficiency. 
The institutional framework of the Kyoto Protocol in this last years is highly supported by 
other contingent and structural factors, such as the increasing oil price on the international 
markets and the increasing concerns for security of energy supply, respectively. For instance, 
the increasing availability of renewable energies could be a positive factor for industries even 
without considering the energetic constraints linked to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Following this line of reasoning, the availability of renewable energies and energy saving 
technologies  could  be  a  source  of  cost  savings  even  for  developing  countries,  actually 
without any bound on GHG emissions, but with high energy costs due to increasing demand 
for fossil fuels, necessary to sustain fast economic growth processes. This could be the case 
of emerging countries, in particular Brazil, China and India, where fossil fuels consumption 
is increasing much more than the increase in fossil fuels production at global level. The 
reduction  of  dependence  from  fossil  fuels  is  strictly  linked  with  reducing  pressure  on 
countries (Middle East and African countries above all) that are typically characterized by 
political instability. The diversification of the energy mix is functional to the reduction of 
risks  and  uncertainties,  thus  reducing  long-term  costs  for  firms  with  energy-intensive 
production processes. 
In  this  paper  we  will  try  to  shed  some  light  on  this  possible  virtuous  cycle  between 
environmental regulations, increasing competitiveness and technology diffusion analyzing a 
very specific industrial sector, such as technologies for the production of renewable energies 
and energy saving. The choice of such a specific focus, and the possibility to test validity of 
the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis, allows us to understand if the Kyoto Protocol can be 
really an efficient environmental regulation framework. The empirical model used in this 
context is based on a gravity equation for international trade flows, following many other 
empirical studies focusing on the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of alternative 
models analyzing the relationships between environmental regulation, innovation and trade; 
Section 3 gives some details of empirical models using gravity equations; Section 4 describes 
the dataset and the methodology used, while in Section 5 the main empirical results are 
reported, and Section 6 concludes with some policy implications.  
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2.  ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, INNOVATION AND TRADE 
The introduction of more stringent environmental regulations has been traditionally seen as 
potentially harmful for the productivity and competitiveness of the national industry as it 
leads to higher costs faced by firms. During the last decade, in a context of increasing flows 
of  international  trade,  this  issue  has  been  largely  debated.  It  has  been  claimed  that  by 
applying more lenient environmental regulations, countries tend to reduce production costs 
of their manufacturers, improving their international competitiveness, but also, potentially 
becoming what the literature calls “pollution havens” (Copeland and Taylor, 2003). 
However, even if at a first sight, the performance of the economy in which more stringent 
environmental policies are implemented seems to be definitely harmed, it can be argued that 
flows of innovation induced by the introduction of severe environmental regulations allow a 
country to become a net exporter of environmental technologies. In fact, the international 
spread  of  regulatory  innovations  can  be  accompanied  by  an  expansion  of  markets  for 
environmental  protection  technologies. The country that firstly introduced more stringent 
environmental standards, by increasing the pressure on industry to develop environmentally 
compatible  production  processes,  can  gain  consistent  advantages  in  the  market for  these 
technologies  or  environmentally  friendly  products.  The  argument,  in  its  most  strong 
formulation, is that the shock produced by a new regulation creates an external pressure on 
firms, which are fostered to create new products and processes, that positively affect the 
dynamic behaviour of that economy and hence its competitiveness and the overall social 
welfare  (Porter  and  van  der  Linde,  1995).  According  to  Jaffe  et  al.  (1995),  a  weak 
interpretation  of  the  hypothesis  brings  to  a  win-win  situation  where  the  stringent 
environmental regulation will increase private net benefits of firms. 
These two contrasting views – the pollution haven effects and the Porter hypothesis - have 
been subject to a substantial amount of empirical analyses which, however, remained largely 
inconclusive. On the one hand, most of the empirical studies estimating the existence of a 
pollution haven hypothesis do not succeed in finding robust support for this argument (Harris 
et al., 2002; Jug and Mirza, 2005). Other studies using specific data for the United States find 
a  significant  effect  of  stringency  on  net  imports  adopting  an  endogenously  determined 
environmental  stringency  variable  (Ederington  and  Minier,  2003;  Levinson  and  Taylor, 
2004).  
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However, these results at least cast some doubts on the effective relevance of the Porter 
hypothesis  in  its  broader  formulation.  The  latter  implies  that  the  benefits  related  to  the 
generation and the diffusion of new technological knowledge, induced by the introduction of 
more stringent environmental regulation, produce relevant spill-over  effects in  the  whole 
economic system spurring its productivity and its comparative advantages. Moreover, also 
the extensive empirical research on the relationship between regulation and green innovation 
failed to produce clear evidence on the subject also due to poor indicators of both regulation 
and environmental innovations (Jaffe et al., 1995, 2005; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). 
The  aim  of  our  analysis  is  to  restrict  the attention  on  a  specific  type  of  environmental-
friendly technologies rather than testing the effects of regulation on the generic trade flow. 
What  we  try  to  find  out  here  is  that  the  introduction  of  more  severe  environmental 
regulations spurs a country’s ability to export those technologies abroad. If this research 
hypothesis is confirmed, the empirical results can shed some lights on the effectiveness of 
some  of  the  mechanisms  underlining  the  Porter  hypothesis  that  much  of  the  previous 
literature failed to properly address. 
In order to build our empirical investigation we have looked at a narrow set of environmental 
technologies  considering  only  the  energy  sector,  such  as  the  production  of  renewable 
energies and energy saving processes and products. Focusing the attention on this specific 
sub-set  of  environmental  technologies,  we  have  considered  the  fact  that  environmental 
protection includes a number of different activities, involving both private and public goods. 
It is the nature itself of the specific environmental good which conduces towards a multiple 
set  of  policy  actions,  whose  efficacy  is  highly  dependent  on  the  chosen  mechanism 
(standards, taxation, market mechanisms, etc.). 
Considering the energy sector, we have made implicit considerations about the role of the 
Kyoto Protocol as an institutional framework formulated in order to reduce typical problems 
affecting  environmental  regulation.  The  Multilateral  Environmental  Agreements  typically 
reduce the existence of free-riders, thus guaranteeing an equal distribution of benefits and 
costs.  Moreover,  the  Kyoto  Protocol  provides  an  institutional  framework  particularly 
favourable to technology diffusion, where market instruments are implemented (the flexible 
mechanisms) with the specific aim of reducing costs for private industries and promoting the 
diffusion of environmental-friendly technologies, especially in developing countries. 
Looking at specific requirements for efficient environmental regulation highlighted by Porter 
and van der Linde (1995), the Kyoto Protocol seems to be well designed because: 1) its focus 
is on outcomes and not technologies (it has clear goals but a flexible approach); 2) it allows  
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an  extended  use  of  market  incentives  (including  tradable  permits);  3)  it  is  based  on  an 
extended regulatory coordination (between industries and regulators, as well as among many 
international counterparts). Such a specific focus clearly help reducing the influence of an 
inefficient environmental regulation on the empirical results of a possible Porter hypothesis, 
which clearly specifies the positive influence of “properly designed environmental standards” 
on the paradigm of dynamic competitiveness (Porter and van der Linde, 1995, pp. 98). As 
underlined in Wagner (2003), an inefficient regulation increases compliance costs for firms, 
thus  making  it  less  likely  for  innovation  benefits  to  offsets  costs,  thus  introducing  a 
systematic bias in empirical studies. 
 
 
3.  REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL MODELS USING GRAVITY EQUATIONS 
Many empirical investigations addressing the relationships between environmental regulation 
and trade flows have adopted a gravity equation model. 
Probably the gravity equation is the most successful empirical trade devise of the last forty 
years. Applied to a wide variety of goods and factors moving over regional and national 
borders under different circumstances, it usually produces good fit. 
The model was first used by Tinbergen (1962), and the basic theoretical model for trade 









G F =   [1] 
 
The  formulation  by  Tinbergen  (1962)  applied  to  international  trade  is  quite  the  same 
functional form of the “Law of Universal Gravitation” developed by Newton in 1687. The 
exact notation is defined as follows: Fij is the flow from origin i to destination j, Mi and Mj 
are the relevant economic sizes of the two locations, measured as the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and/or as the population of the two locations. Dij is the distance between the locations 
(usually measured centre to centre). G is a gravitational constant depending on the units of 
measurement for Fij, Mi and Mj. 
The gravity equation can be thought of as a kind of short-hand representation of supply and 
demand forces. If country i is the origin, then Mi represents the total amount it is willing to 
supply to all customers. Meanwhile Mj represents the total amount destination j demands.  
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Distance acts as a  counter  force,  where  the  larger  the  distance  the  higher  the  trade  and 
transport costs. 
The gravity equation of trade predicts that the volume of bilateral trade is positively related 
to the product of the countries’ GDP and negatively related to trade barriers between trade 
partners (Leamer and Levinson, 1992). 
A  large  body  of  literature  try  to  understand  both  theoretically  and  empirically  the  real 
explanation  capacity  of  the  gravity  model  for  increasing  trade  flows,  including  the 
investigation  of  other  conditional  variables  such  as  the  role  of  trade  openness  (or 
protectionism), and other policy aspects, such as environmental regulation. 
Following Anderson (1979), it has been increasingly recognized that the gravity equation 
prediction can be derived from very different structural models, including Ricardian models, 
Heckscher-Ohlin models, and increasing returns to scale models (IRS). 
As underlined in Evenett and Keller (1998), when consumers have both identical homothetic 
preferences and access to the same goods prices, a sufficient condition for obtaining a gravity 
equation is perfect product specialization (each commodity is produced only in one country). 
The  three  types  of  trade  models  differ  in  the  way  product  specialization  is  obtained  in 
equilibrium:  technology  differences  across  countries  (in  the  Ricardian  model),  factor 
proportions (in the H-O model), and increasing returns at the firm level in the IRS model. 
As suggested by Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), something other than IRS is responsible 
for the empirical success of the gravity equations. 
In a constant returns H-O world, bilateral factor proportions differences must be very large in 
order to ensure that the economies lie outside a common space of diversification and to 
generate product specialization. Therefore, in the H-O model, trade is mainly (exclusively) 
inter-industry  trade,  explaining  the  North-South  trade.  For  the  IRS  model  at  least  some, 
potentially all, trade is intra-industry trade, explaining the North-North or the South-South 
trade patterns (Evenett and Keller, 1998). This might suggest that the gravity equation could 
be  used  both  for  explaining  trade  flows  between  countries  with  large  factor  proportion 
differences and for trade partners with high shares of bilateral intra-industry trade. 
In order to facilitate empirical computation of the gravity model, eq. [1] can be transformed 
in log terms, hence obtaining a linear relationship as follows: 
 
ij ij j i ij D M M G F e q b a + - + + = ln ln ln ln ln   [2] 
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The value of lnG (a constant term) corresponds to the intercept, while the expected value of 
the coefficient ￿ and ￿ is not significantly different from 1. The inclusion of the error term ￿ij 
delivers an equation that can be estimated using econometric techniques. 
The empirical model often includes variables to account for other aspects than GDP and 
population,  such  as  price  levels,  language  relationships,  tariffs,  spatial  contiguity,  and 
colonial history. 
The following major explanations try to highlight the importance of distance in trade flows: 
(i) distance is a proxy for transport costs; (ii) distance indicates the time elapsed during 
shipment, and this is mainly an important aspect of trade for perishable goods; (iii) distance 
is  important  for  the  synchronization  of  multiple  inputs  in  the  production  process;  (iv) 
communication and transaction costs increase with distance. 
The gravity equation has been widely used to analyse the relationship between environmental 
regulation and trade flows, especially in a research context oriented towards the investigation 
of the existence of a pollution haven effect. Recent examples of such analyses are Greter and 
de Melo (2003), Harris et al. (2002), Jug and Mirza (2005), van Beers and van den Bergh 
(2000), all addressing for the existence of a pollution haven path of trade flows related to 
more stringent environmental regulation. The results are not univocal, thus not producing 
robust findings in favour of the pollution haven effects. Nonetheless, many interesting results 
have  been  produced  especially  related  to  the  modelling  of  the  variables  explaining 
environmental regulation stringency. 
On the other side, empirical findings of the Porter hypothesis are mainly based on specific 
industries rather than a broad sector or economic system, because it is necessary to identify 
more precisely conditions and parameters for an industry to profit from stringent regulation 
(Wagner, 2003). In this sense, Albrecht (1998) has focused his analysis on specific industries 
affected  by  the  Montreal  Protocol  on  Ozone-Depleting  Substances  (e.g.,  refrigerators, 
freezers,  air  conditioning  equipments,  etc.),  and  he  provides  evidence  on  the  Porter 
hypothesis for two countries, Denmark and the United States. The choice of an international 
regulatory framework such as the Montreal Protocol is in line with the reduction of biases 
related to inefficient environmental standards. In the same venue, Murty and Kumar (2003) 
analyse the influence of environmental regulation on the productive efficiency of specific 
firms in water-polluting industries in India, finding that the higher is firms’ compliance, the 
lower is the technical inefficiency of the firm, thus lending support to the Porter hypothesis.  
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Finally, from the meta-regression analysis provided by Mulatu et al. (2001), there emerges 
that econometric studies based on gravity equation models seem to provide less evidence in 
favour of the pollution haven hypothesis, thus indirectly supporting the Porter hypothesis. 
 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATASET 
The empirical formulation of the gravity equation used in this paper is quite similar in the 
formal structure to other gravity equations used for the analysis of the impact on trade flows 
related to environmental stringency. 
The  exporting  countries  for  this  analysis  (our  i  countries  in  the  gravity  equation)  are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States. The sample for j countries includes 148 countries (including OECD countries). 
The time period analyzed goes from 1996 to 2005 (unfortunately in most of the countries 
there are data only until 2004). 
The exact formulation of the gravity equation analyzed in a panel context is as follows: 
 
+ + + + + + = jt it ij jt it ijt EXP E E G M M 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln b b b b b a  
  ij jt jt it e b b b + + + + X I I 8 7 6   [3] 
 
The dependent variable EXPijt represents the bilateral export flows (from country i to country 
j) at time t of technologies for renewable energies and energy saving (calculated at 2000 
constant  PPP  international  $).  Data  for  export  flows  are  extracted  from  COMTRADE 
database (UNCTAD) based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(HS 1996). The typologies of technologies to exploit renewable energies and to enhance 
energy  efficiency  are  well  defined  by  OECD  (Steenblick,  2005)  starting  from  the 
classification HS 1996 (see Appendix Table A2). In the OECD document the list includes all 
processes and products with the principal purpose of environmental protection. In this paper 
we  have  restricted  the  sample  covering  only  technologies  for  the  energy  sector.  This 
methodological choice strictly derived from the general framework of this study, where we 
are investigating the role of environmental regulation in stimulating technical progress in a 
context of a properly designed institutional framework. Moreover, considering the energy 
sector, and indirectly the Kyoto Protocol framework, what we are interested in is the OECD 
(and the EU particularly) area rather than an enlarged countries sample (Brazil for biofuels  
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for instance). Increasing the country sample and the typologies of HS codes could be the next 
research task. Finally, there is some scepticism on using national competitiveness measures 
(such  as  export  flows  or  Foreign  Directs  Investment  patterns)  rather  than  more  direct 
measures  of  productivity  improvements  in  order  to  assess  the  effect  of  environmental 
regulation on firm’s economic performance (Jaffe et al., 1995). A narrower definition of the 
economic sector – as the specification here adopted - allows partially reducing this bias. 
The variables included in the vectors of independent covariates are the following (see the 
Appendix  Table  A1  for  the  exact  definition,  the  acronym  and  the  data  source  for  each 
variable): 
 
M = Mass, explaining the role of income (GDP) and population size (POP) for countries i 
and j. 
 
G = Geography, including geographic distances following the calculations provided by the 
CEPII (DIST), the geographic contiguity as a dummy variable (CONT), the existence of past 




E = Environmental regulation, represented by the CO2 emissions, the current environmental 
protection expenditures both of the public and the private sectors (CURE), the percentage of 
revenues from  environmental  taxes  on  total  revenues  (ENVTAX),  and  finally  the  public 
investments on environmental protection (ENVINV). All these measures of environmental 
regulation have been tested separately in order to reinforce the robustness of the empirical 
results.  The  environmental  expenditures  data  provided  by  EUROSTAT  allow  describing 
directly the environmental regulation accounting for the expenditures sustained by private 
industries and the public sector in order to respect environmental standards. Unfortunately, 
using these variables has a great limitation, because we are forced to exclude completely 
other non-EU OECD countries. In order to test our model on the complete sample, we have 
adopted  an  indirect  measure  of  environmental  stringency  as  the  level  of  CO2  emission 
                                                
1 In this paper we have adopted as distance measure the simple distances, for which only one city is necessary to 
calculate international distances. There is also an alternative distance measure, given by the weighted distances, 
for  which  data  on  the  principal  cities  in  each  country  are  necessary.  The  simple  distances  are  calculated 
following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important city (in terms of 
population) or of its official capital. The weighted distance measures use city-level data to assess the geographic 
distribution of population inside each nation. The idea is to calculate distance between two countries based on 
bilateral distances between the largest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by 
the share of the city in the overall country’s population (Mayer and Zignago, 2006). Using weighted distances 
in our empirical analysis does not change significantly the obtained results.  
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(expressed  as kg per unit of GDP  at  2000 constant PPP  international  $). Using such  an 
indirect  measures  give  us  the  possibility  to  analyse  two  separate  environment-trade 
relationship.  The  environmental  stringency  of  the  exporting  country  (country  i)  in  this 
specific  case  gives  an  indication  if  environmental  regulation  is  pushing  technology 
advancements in industrialized countries, thus investigating the Porter and van der Linde 
hypothesis. On the contrary, the environmental stringency of the importing country (country 
j) gives us the dimension of the importance of an institutional framework in the trade partner. 
Considering  that  developing  countries  are  excluded  from  any  commitment  in  the  Kyoto 
Protocol, if they are acting towards a reduction of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, it means 
that their development strategies are oriented towards energy savings and the adoption on 
renewable  energies,  thus  revealing  the  effectiveness  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol  even  in  its 
voluntary agreements. 
 
I = Innovation, explained  by alternative measures,  such as the number of patents  in the 
energy  sector  (ENEPAT),  the  number  of  total  patents  from  residents  (TOTPAT),  the 
percentage  of  research  and  development  expenditures  (RD).  The  last  two  innovation 
variables were provided both for countries i and j, in order to control for the role of National 
Innovation Systems in explaining bilateral export flows by providing the correct environment 
for technological innovation (country i) and for international technological diffusion (country 
j), while ENEPAT is available only for exporting countries. Considering that even TOTPAT 
and RD are mainly available for developed countries, we have considered an alternative 
measure of technological diffusion specifically built for developing countries (TECDIFF), 
following the methodology adopted by Archibugi and Coco (2004). In this way, we have 
considered  the  capacity  of  the  whole  economic  system  to  use  and  adopt  the  imported 
technologies, rather than the capacity to reproduce them (for the specific formulation of the 
ArCo index see the Appendix). 
 
X  =  Other  control  variables  for  countries  j,  such  as  the  importance  of  Foreign  Direct 
Investment inflows (FDI), and the quality of the institutions expressed as the capacity to 
respect legal rules (RL), using the index of rule of law provided by the World Bank with the 
empirical work of Kauffman et al. (2003).
2 
                                                
2 There are many alternative measures of institutional quality which are used in different empirical studies, such 
as the Corruption Perspectives Index provided by Transparency International (TICPI) that is considered more 
accurate than Rule of Law. The main problem is related to data availability for TICPI, while at the same time 
there  is  a  high  positive  correlation  between  TICPI  and  Rule  of  Law  index  provided  by  the  World  Bank 
(Dasgupta et al., 2006).  
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5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results  of our empirical investigation show that a gravity equation model is a good 
framework of analysis to test our hypotheses. The first 2 columns of Table 1 report the 
results  for  the  baseline  gravity  equation  model  in  which  only  “structural”  variables  are 
considered.  Very  briefly,  the  higher  the  income  level  of  both  exporting  and  importing 
countries, the larger the trade flows even in the case of a specific sector as the one here 
analyzed. The distances between the trading partner plays as well a great role, where reduced 
distances  are  more  favourable  to  increasing  trade  flows.  Considering  the  negative  sign 
associated to the size of population for both i and j countries, this is not so distant from other 
empirical results, meaning that in this specific case the role of the mass in attracting imports 
of advanced technologies is positively related to the level of income per capita rather than the 
number  of  potential  consumers  (given  by  the  population  size).  In  order  to  maintain  the 
original formulation of the gravity equation, we have continued to include separately income 
and population. 
Both Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimates are shown. However, the significance of 
the statistics associated to the Hausman test, gives clear indication that country individual 
effects are relevant in our analysis and that Fixed Effect estimates have to be preferred to the 
Random Effects ones. We found that this is true for all the model specifications we have 
tested and, therefore,  we show  only the results accounting for country individual effects 
(columns 3-5).
3 
Columns  3-5  of  Table  1  show  that  environmental  regulation  plays  an  important  role  in 
shaping  the  bilateral  export  flows  of  environmental-friendly  technologies  in  the  energy 
sector. The coefficients associated to the more relevant proxies of environmental stringency 
(CURE and CO2) are in fact strongly significant and show the expected signs. While for the 
variable explaining efforts in environmental protection (CURE) the higher the value the more 
stringent is environmental regulation, CO2 emissions should be considered as an indirect 
proxy  of  environmental  standards.  If  a  country  is  applying  stringent  (and  efficient) 
environmental regulation, the level of CO2 emissions will be lesser. In this case we have 
adopted  CO2 emissions because  there is  a complete  dataset  for  this  pollutant for  all  the 
                                                
3 Considering results from fixed effects models, the coefficients associated to the size of the exporter’s economy 
(GDPi) are higher than those related to the importers (GDPj), and this is consistent with theoretical results 
reported by Feenstra et al. (2001) for the case of “differentiated goods”, where the domestic-income elasticity 
exceeds the partner-income elasticity.  
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countries and years analysed, thus allowing the largest sample easy to estimate. Moreover, in 
this case we can consider environmental regulation even for the importing countries, thus 
exploring the hypothesis that even the standards in the receiving countries could be possible 
drivers of technological diffusion. Finally, CO2 emissions are closely related to the Kyoto 
Protocol commitments (our properly designed environmental regulation) and this is, at the 
best of our knowledge, the only proxy variable giving an approximation of countries’ efforts 
to respect Kyoto abatement targets. The expected sign for CO2 related to country j is correct 
in all the three models, but it is never statistically significant, thus not confirming that this 
could be a driver for technological imports. 
Summing up, we could say that CURE is the variable which better represents the efforts 
made by private firms (compliance costs) to respect environmental regulation, while CO2 
emissions are a proxy of the overall national efforts to respect the standards. 
 
>> INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE << 
 
The  second  step  of  our  empirical  analysis  is  to  introduce  in  our  econometric  model 
technological  variables  which  account  for  the  strength  of  national  innovation  systems 
(ENEPAT, TOTPAT, and RD). The results reported in Table 2 confirm our hypothesis that 
the national innovative capacity of exporters plays a crucial role in affecting their ability to 
penetrate the international market for energy technologies. In order to test the robustness of 
our  results  we  have  performed  different  specifications  of  the  model,  using  alternative 
measures of both environmental regulations’ stringency and of technological competencies. 
In Columns 1-3 we show the results for the models in which CO2 has been used as a proxy 
for  environmental  regulation  in  countries  i  and  different  technological  variables  are 
alternatively  introduced.  It  emerges  that  the  intensity  of  research  activities  of  exporters 
(either measured in terms of R&D expenditures or in terms of patent applications) has a 
positive and significant effect on the export performance of the countries considered in the 
analysis.  In  particular,  the  results  of  Column  3  show  that  the  stronger  technological 
specialization is in the field of energy production, transmission and distribution (expressed 
by ENEPAT), the higher is the gain in terms of comparative advantages in terms of trade 
flows of energy technologies. These results are confirmed also when CURE is used as a 
measure of environmental regulation in exporting countries (Columns 4-6). The variables 
concerning the regulatory activities and technological capacities of importing countries (both 
measured  in  terms  of  R&D  intensity,  RD,  or  in  terms  of  our  indicator  of  technological  
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diffusion, TECDIFF, as in Columns 7 and 8) are not significant. This implies that these two 
aspects are not relevant in explaining bilateral export flows of the particular kind of products 
we are investigating. This result is consistent with the previous considerations about the role 
of environmental regulation implemented in the importing countries. Therefore, it seems to 
emerge  that the major drivers for relative comparative advantages  are the  environmental 
regulation and the quality of the innovation system of the exporters. 
 
>> INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE << 
 
Finally, the results for the full model, in which other control variables such as the flow of 
Foreign Direct Investments and the proxy for the quality of institutions in importer countries 
are introduced, are shown in Table 3 where also we report the results of the robustness 
checks we have carried out. The first two columns show the output for the full model using 
alternative  regulation  and  technological  variables.  The  results  are  stable  and  also  the 
additional  variables  used  significantly  enter  in  the  model  with  the  expected  signs.  In 
particular,  two  robustness  checks  have  been  performed  to  address  the  problems  of 
heteroskedasticity  and  potential  endogeneity  of  the  regressors  relative  to  environmental 
regulation. The role of endogenous environmental regulation in the analysis of relationships 
between stringent standards and trade flow has been recently addressed by Jug and Mirza 
(2005) in a specific gravity equation model, and more generally by Ederington and Minier 
(2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2004), in the detection of the existence of pollution haven 
effects. 
Going into details, in order to verify if potential problems of heteroskedasticity affect our 
results, we have relaxed the assumption of time-invariant variance in the idiosyncratic errors 
by  applying  the  FEGLS  estimator.  Columns  3  and  4  contain  the  results  of  these  robust 
estimates. Since differences in the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients are 
modest with respect to the FE estimator, it is possible to conclude that heteroskedasticity has 
not seriously biased previous figures. Second, the two versions of the full model have been 
tested  using  the  Instrumental  Variable  estimator  (IV)  in  order  to  check  if  the  potential 
endogeneity of the variables relative to environmental regulation has affected our results. We 
follow the standard procedure of using lagged levels (two periods back) of the endogenous 
covariate  as  instrument  after  controlling  for  individual  effects.  The  results  obtained  by 
applying this technique are showed in column 5 and 6 of Table 3. Since the results obtained 
with  the  use  of  appropriate  instruments  are  consistent  with  those  obtained  with  the  FE  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have tested an empirical model based on a gravity equation in order to 
provide evidence of the relevance of the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis. Empirical 
results show that a more stringent environmental regulation provides a positive impulse for 
increasing  investments  in  advanced  technological  equipments,  thus  providing  an  indirect 
source  of  comparative  advantages  at  international  level.  Countries  with  stringent 
environmental  standards  have  a  higher  export  capacity  for  those  environmental-friendly 
technologies that regulation induces to adopt. Far from contrasting empirical results on the 
existence of a pollution haven effects, the aim of the paper was to test if a proper institutional 
framework such as a properly designed environmental regulation could be considered as a 
positive impulse to competitiveness rather than a limit to economic development. Applying a 
gravity equation on a very specific definition of environmental technologies, focusing on the 
energy sector, what strongly emerges is the positive effects of both environmental regulation 
and the effectiveness of national innovation systems. These results seem to reinforce the 
European strategies addressed in the recent policy papers edited by the Commission (EC, 
2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007) where environmental protection and energy security initiatives 
could be well integrated in the wider Lisbon strategy for economic growth, innovation and 
employment. 
The  next  research  agenda  would  include,  among  the  other,  the  construction  of  a  direct 
environmental regulation measure valid for all the OECD countries (and not only for the 
European Union), the construction of a more general dependent variable including all high 
technology  environmental protection activities, and finally  the  realization  of a system of 
equations in order to analyse the possible endogenous mechanisms involving the innovation 
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TABLE 1 – BASIC GRAVITY EQUATION AND THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
  (1) FE  (1) RE  (3)  (4)  (5) 
GDPj  0.548*  1.137*  0.486*  0.429*  0.410* 
  (4.61)  (37.04)  (3.95)  (3.09)  (2.95) 
GDPi  1.953*  0.222**  1.929*  3.039*  3.742* 
  (28.62)  (2.14)  (28.20)  (35.22)  (42.59) 
POPj  -2.138*  -0.467*  -2.228*  -2.544*  -2.839* 
  (-7.15)  (-10.93)  (-7.29)  (-7.33)  (-8.14) 
POPi  -0.941*  0.694*  -0.900*  -1.908*  -2.704* 
  (-13.67)  (6.38)  (-13.04)  (-22.15)  (-30.86) 
DIST  -1.589*  -0.997*  -1.540*  -1.325*  -1.248* 
  (-74.79)  (-22.77)  (-69.60)  (-28.91)  (-27.24) 
COL  1.419*  1.619*  1.393*  1.273*  1.293* 
  (27.16)  (9.52)  (26.53)  (23.65)  (24.19) 
CONT  -0.282*  0.784*  -0.230*  -0.005  0.035 
  (-3.36)  (2.96)  (-2.74)  (-0.05)  (0.36) 
AREA  -0.114***  0.024  1.102*  1.269*  1.391* 
  (-1.68)  (0.91)  (8.88)  (8.98)  (9.80) 
CO2j      -0.022  -0.04  -0.051 
      (-0.32)  (-0.53)  (-0.68) 
CO2i      -0.277*     
      (-7.67)     
CUREi        0.041*   
        (8.85)   
ENVINVi          -0.002 
          (-0.20) 
CONST  40.548*  -5.423*  24.478*  28.884*  35.924* 
  (11.16)  (-6.94)  (8.79)  (9.00)  (9.21) 
           
Adj R
2  0.70  0.54  0.70  0.71  0.73 
Obs  20342  20342  20125  14253  13557 
Hausman  13687.18*         
Statistics for t-Student in parenthesis. * p-values < 0.01, ** p-values < 0.05, *** p-values < 0.1. 
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TABLE 2 – TESTING THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
GDPj  0.686*  0.578**  0.962*  0.951*  0.781*  1.021*  0.643*  0.753* 
  (2.76)  (2.37)  (3.82)  (3.57)  (2.83)  (3.57)  (3.89)  (4.08) 
GDPi  1.100*  2.157*  1.076*  1.182*  2.457*  2.124*  1.087*  2.760* 
  (8.86)  (18.89)  (7.14)  (8.13)  (16.94)  (9.04)  (10.95)  (14.58) 
POPj  -2.699*  -3.538*  -2.579*  -2.960*  -3.476*  -2.939*  -2.024*  -2.158* 
  (-3.47)  (-4.58)  (-3.24)  (-3.55)  (-4.00)  (-3.28)  (-5.59)  (-5.24) 
POPi  -0.092  -1.180*  -0.058  0.001  -1.371*  -0.938*  -0.112  -1.582* 
  (-0.73)  (-10.32)  (-0.39)  (0.01)  (-9.57)  (-4.15)  (-1.11)  (-8.67) 
DIST  -1.524*  -1.514*  -1.498*  -1.175*  -1.231*  -1.303*  -1.571*  -1.375* 
  (-54.05)  (-56.08)  (-57.44)  (-21.93)  (-22.35)  (-21.88)  (-64.38)  (-24.46) 
COL  0.917*  0.997*  0.957*  0.917*  0.954*  0.996*  1.398*  1.258* 
  (12.33)  (13.27)  (12.35)  (11.93)  (11.94)  (12.42)  (26.01)  (22.75) 
CONT  -0.319*  -0.368*  -0.311*  -0.017  -0.077  -0.05  -0.320*  -0.141 
  (-3.30)  (-3.80)  (-3.16)  (-0.16)  (-0.69)  (-0.45)  (-3.51)  (-1.31) 
AREA  1.647*  2.253*  1.576*  1.756*  2.021*  1.568*  0.966*  -0.107 
  (4.34)  (6.01)  (3.65)  (3.88)  (4.77)  (3.50)  (6.18)  (-1.14) 
CO2j  -0.004  -0.044  -0.094  0.076  0.05  0.078  -0.013  0.029 
  (-0.02)  (-0.26)  (-0.55)  (0.42)  (0.26)  (0.41)  (-0.18)  (0.32) 
CO2i  -0.383*  -0.356*  -0.302*        -0.258*   
  (-6.87)  (-7.19)  (-6.14)        (-6.02)   
CUREi        0.071***  0.045*  0.038*    0.027* 
        (10.52)  (6.21)  (5.62)    (5.08) 
RDi  0.712*      0.914*      0.642*   
  (17.61)      (21.11)      (20.31)   
TOTPATi    0.110*      0.174*       
    (6.64)      (8.50)       
ENEPATi      0.137*      0.270*    0.249* 
      (8.19)      (14.44)    (17.21) 
RDj  -0.028  -0.008  0.017  -0.195  -0.116  -0.088     
  (-0.24)  (-0.07)  (0.15)  (-1.55)  (-0.88)  (-0.68)     
TECDIFFj              -0.351  -0.391 
              (-1.53)  (-1.46) 
CONST  19.774*  30.068*  19.182*  16.931**  26.884*  20.554*  19.288*  37.464* 
  (3.26)  (5.01)  (2.68)  (2.27)  (3.95)  (2.88)  (5.52)  (6.84) 
Adj R
2  0.74  0.73  0.76  0.76  0.74  0.78  0.72  0.75 
Obs  8002  8592  7436  6155  6256  5100  15779  10277 
Statistics for t-Student in parenthesis. * p-values < 0.01, ** p-values < 0.05, *** p-values < 0.1. 
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TABLE 3 – TESTS FOR ROBUSTNESS 
  (1)  (2)  (1) GLS  (2) GLS  (1) IV  (2) IV 
GDPj  0.732*  0.543*  0.823*  0.770*  0.909*  0.553** 
  (4.84)  (3.33)  (9.87)  (8.17)  (4.57)  (2.57) 
GDPi  0.995*  1.192*  0.754*  1.347*  0.392*  0.666* 
  (8.38)  (9.71)  (13.10)  (18.51)  (2.74)  (4.60) 
POPj  -1.566*  -1.674*  -1.673*  -2.034*  -1.804*  -1.934* 
  (-4.11)  (-4.06)  (-9.32)  (-8.81)  (-3.23)  (-3.21) 
POPi  -0.035  -0.03  0.210*  -0.207*  0.541*  0.492* 
  (-0.29)  (-0.25)  (3.58)  (-2.87)  (3.77)  (3.40) 
DIST  -1.541*  -1.363*  -1.509*  -1.383*  -1.557*  -1.328* 
  (-66.87)  (-27.67)  (-125.77)  (-56.63)  (-58.62)  (-23.64) 
COL  1.300*  1.216*  1.121*  1.004*  1.259*  1.182* 
  (23.00)  (21.18)  (40.66)  (32.24)  (19.38)  (18.08) 
CONT  -0.393*  -0.151  -0.331*  -0.166*  -0.445*  -0.129 
  (-4.06)  (-1.47)  (-9.87)  (-4.43)  (-3.94)  (-1.09) 
AREA  -0.102  0.059  -0.072  0.105**  -0.084  0.076 
  (-1.17)  (0.63)  (-1.60)  (1.98)  (-0.70)  (0.60) 
CO2j  0.045  -0.001  -0.007  0.013  -0.007  -0.065 
  (0.56)  -(0.02)  (-0.14)  (0.26)  (-0.07)  (-0.66) 
CO2i  -0.181*    -0.085*    -0.161*   
  (-4.61)    (-4.26)    (-3.48)   
CUREi    0.063*    0.042*    0.088* 
    (11.31)    (15.40)    (9.02) 
RDi    0.815*    0.719*    0.919* 
    (22.85)    (38.05)    (23.16) 
ENEPATi  0.106*    0.094*    0.122*   
  (7.97)    (13.28)    (8.01)   
FDIj  0.051*  0.038**  0.032*  0.016***  0.037***  0.028 
  (2.99)  (2.00)  (4.10)  (1.74)  (1.81)  (1.26) 
RLj  0.280*  0.386*  0.292*  0.281*  0.174  0.336** 
  (2.94)  (3.81)  (5.90)  (5.32)  (1.39)  (2.57) 
CONST  26.161*  23.305*  23.557*  24.729*  26.345*  24.721* 
  (5.40)  (4.44)  (4.41)  (3.11)  (3.69)  (3.18) 
Adj R
2  0.74  0.73      0.74  0.73 
Obs  13788  11347  13788  11347  10551  8912 
Statistics for t-Student in parenthesis. * p-values < 0.01, ** p-values < 0.05, *** p-values < 0.1. 
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APPENDIX – VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
TABLE A1 – DEFINITION OF VARIABLES, STATISTIC SOURCES AND ACRONYMS 
Variable  Definition  Source 
  Dependent variable   
EXPij  Bilateral export flows in renewable energies and energy saving technologies 
(at constant 2000$ PPP) (HS definition Table A2) 
UNCTAD 
  Mass   
GDPi and j  Natural logarithm of GDP (constant 2000 US$)  WDI 
POPi and j  Natural logarithm of total population  WDI 
AREAj  Natural logarithm of land area (sq. km)  WDI 
  Geography   
DISTj  Geographic distances ()  CEPII 
COLj  Existence of colonial relationships (dummy variable)  CEPII 
CONTj  Geographic contiguity (dummy variable)  CEPII 
  Environmental regulation   
CO2i and j  Natural logarithm of CO2 emission (kg per 2000 PPP $ of GDP)  WDI 
CUREi  Current environmental protection expenditure (public+industry) as % of GDP  EUROSTAT 
ENVTAXi  Revenues from environmental taxes as % of total tax revenues  EUROSTAT 
ENVINVi  Public Environmental investments as % of GDP  EUROSTAT 
  Innovation   
RDi and j  Research and development expenditure as % of GDP  WDI 
TOTPATi 
and j 
Patent applications, residents (per 100.000 people)  WDI 
ENEPATi  Natural logarithm of the moving average of the number of patents in the class 
“equipment for production, distribution or transformation of energy” (% of 
total patents from residents) 
USPTO 
TECDIFFj  Technological diffusion (ARCO index methodology)  WDI 
  Other control variables   
FDIj  Total FDI inflows as % of GDP  WDI 
RLj  Rule of Law (Kauffman et al., 2003)  World Bank 
 
Considering that human skills are widely represented by the human development dimensions, 
we  have  built  a  new  technological  index  based  only  on  two  out  the  four  components 
proposed  by  Archibugi  and  Coco  (2004).  In  order  to  represent  the  technological 
infrastructures we have accounted for internet and telephone penetration (number of internet, 
fixed and mobile telephone lines per 1.000 persons). The final formulation of this index 


















i i   [4]  
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As  we can see, the formulation of the ARCO index  is based  on the  same  methodology 
adopted for the HDI, where the observed values are normalised by a minimum and maximum 
value. In this case the minimum value is always equal to zero, while the maximum value has 
been  taken  in  the  whole  time  period/countries  sample  considered  in  this  work.  This 
formulation gives the possibility to account for temporal changes at country level, as well as 
the methodology adopted by UNDP for the HDI. Following the UNDP methodology, the 
component related to telephone users has been considered in a logarithm form, creating “a 
threshold above which the technological capacity of a country is no longer enriched by the 
use  of  telephones”  (Archibugi  and  Coco,  2004,  p.  635).  We  have  not  considered  the 
electricity  consumption  within  the  technological  infrastructures  because  there  are  other 
energy related variables in our model. 
 
TABLE A2 - TECHNOLOGIES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND ENERGY SAVINGS, HS 1996 
Code  Description 
Renewable energies 
2207.10  Ethanol 
2905.11  Methanol 
4401.10  Fuel wood, in logs, in billets, in twigs, in faggots or in similar forms 
4401.30  Sawdust and wood waste and scrap, whether or not agglomerated in logs, briquettes, 
pellets or similar forms 
7321.13  Cooking appliances and plate warmers for solid fuel, iron or steel 
7321.83  Non electrical domestic appliances for liquid fuel 
8410.11  Of a power not exceeding 1,000kW 
8410.12  Of a power exceeding 1,000 kW but not exceeding 10,000 kW 
8410.13  Of a power exceeding 10,000 kW. 8410.90 – Parts, including regulators 
8410.90  Hydraulic turbines and water wheels; parts, including regulators 
8413.81  Pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with a measuring device; [Wind turbine pump] 
8419.11  Instantaneous gas water heaters 
8419.19  Instantaneous or storage water heaters, non-electric — other [solar water heaters] 
8502.31  Electric generating sets and rotary converters — Wind powered 
8502.40  Electric generating sets and rotary converters [a generating set combining an electric 
generator and either a hydraulic turbine or a Sterling engine] 
8541.40  Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including photovoltaic cells whether or not 
assembled in modules or made up into panels; light-emitting diodes 
Energy savings and management 
3815.00  Catalysts 
7008.00  Multiple-walled insulating units of glass 
7019.90  Other glass fibre products 
8404.20  Condensers for steam or other vapour power units 
8409.99  Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the engines of HS 8407 or 8408; other 
8418.69  Heat pumps 
8419.50  Heat exchange units 
8419.90  Parts for heat exchange equipment 
8539.31  Fluorescent lamps, hot cathode 
8543.19  Fuel cells 
9028.10  Gas supply, production and calibrating metres 
9028.20  Liquid supply, production and calibrating metres 
9032.10  Thermostats 
Source: Steenblick (2005).  
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TABLE A3 – MAIN STATISTICS 
Variable  No. Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
EXPij  24766  6.38  2.86  -3.91  14.37 
GDPi  29600  13.16  1.22  11.22  16.23 
GDPj  24320  10.93  1.82  6.87  16.19 
POPi  29600  16.79  1.20  15.11  19.51 
POPj  29400  15.95  1.78  11.04  20.99 
DIST  29600  6637  4249  60  19586 
AREAj  29200  831078  2083308  50  16400000 
CO2i  29600  -0.98  0.34  -1.71  -0.29 
CO2j  27200  -0.99  0.92  -3.91  1.29 
CUREi  20720  1.58  0.71  -0.73  2.65 
ENVTAXi  23680  1.98  0.22  1.59  2.42 
ENVINVi  19240  1.91  1.44  0.10  6.10 
Rdi  21312  0.58  0.48  -0.67  1.45 
RDj  11440  -0.41  1.05  -4.61  1.61 
TOTPATi  22940  3.04  1.24  -0.35  5.71 
TOTPATj  11920  1.16  2.16  -5.44  5.71 
ENEPATi  19240  -1.41  1.04  -3.35  0.78 
TECDIFFj  28520  0.41  0.20  0.00  1.06 
FDIj  25260  0.75  1.30  -4.61  4.54 
RLj  29220  0.09  1.00  -2.03  2.71 
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TABLE A4 – CORRELATION MATRIX 
  COLj  CONTj  RLj  TECDIFFj  ENVINVi  GDPi  GDPj  DISTj  AREAj  CO2j 
COLj  0.22                   
CONTj  0.04  0.17                 
RLj  0.04  0.10  0.74               
TECDIFFj  -0.03  0.08  -0.01  -0.20             
ENVINVi  0.09  0.06  0.00  0.02  -0.04           
GDPi  0.07  0.11  0.30  0.16  -0.01  0.00         
GDPj  0.03  -0.41  -0.21  -0.21  0.01  0.02  0.07       
DISTj  0.09  -0.03  -0.20  -0.20  0.02  0.00  0.61  0.20     
AREAj  0.03  -0.08  -0.39  -0.19  0.02  -0.01  -0.13  -0.02  0.06   
CO2j  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.09  0.08  -0.14  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
POPj  0.05  0.02  -0.14  -0.24  0.02  0.00  0.88  0.22  0.73  0.01 
POPi  0.09  0.05  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.90  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.01 
CUREi  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.45  -0.01  -0.06  0.00  0.01 
ENVTAXi  0.05  0.05  0.00  -0.05  0.03  0.77  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.01 
ENEPATi  -0.13  -0.04  0.02  0.09  -0.09  -0.61  0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
TOTPATj  -0.01  0.15  0.61  0.65  -0.04  0.00  0.29  -0.29  -0.07  0.08 
TOTPATi  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.08  -0.07  0.10  0.01  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01 
RDj  0.03  0.17  0.71  0.70  -0.04  0.00  0.46  -0.31  -0.04  -0.09 
RDi  -0.07  0.00  0.02  0.14  -0.31  -0.30  0.01  -0.06  -0.02  -0.02 
FDIj  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.11  -0.05  0.00  -0.29  -0.11  -0.31  0.17 
                     
  CO2i  POPj  POPi  CUREi  ENVTAXi  ENEPATi  TOTPATj  TOTPATi  RDj  RDi 
POPj  0.01                   
POPi  -0.14  0.00                 
CUREi  0.18  0.00  -0.48               
ENVTAXi  0.14  0.00  0.77  -0.35             
ENEPATi  0.17  -0.01  -0.60  0.16  -0.28           
TOTPATj  -0.02  -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.03         
TOTPATi  0.21  -0.01  0.10  0.04  0.25  0.25  0.02       
RDj  -0.03  0.08  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.81  0.02     
RDi  0.16  -0.02  -0.31  0.38  -0.16  0.60  0.04  0.67  0.04   
FDIj  -0.01  -0.33  0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.02  -0.06  -0.01  -0.08  0.01 
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